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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/510RESEARCH ARTICLE Open AccessMarket competition and price of disease
management programmes: an observational study
Christel E van Dijk1*, Bob Venema1, Judith D de Jong1 and Dinny H de Bakker1,2Abstract
Background: Managed competition was introduced into the health care system in several countries including the
Netherlands, although effects of competition of both providers and health insurers on the price of health care are
inconclusive. We investigated the association between competition of both providers (care groups) and health
insurers and the price of disease management programmes (DMPs).
Methods: Data from 76 DMP contractual agreements for type II diabetes mellitus in 2008, 2009 and 2010 were used to
analyse the association between market competition and the price of DMPs. Market competition was calculated per
municipal health services region (GGD). Insurer market competition was measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), care group competition by the number of care groups and the care group market share of GPs. The effect of
competition was cross-sectionally studied with linear regression analyses.
Results: Insurer market concentration (HHI) and care group market share were not associated with the price of DMPs.
The number of care groups in a GGD region was associated with a lower price (−€4.68; 95% CI: −8.36 - -1.00). The mean
difference in the price of DMPs between health insurers was €58.
Conclusions: The price of DMPs seems to be more dependent on the particular health insurer than on market
conditions. For competition among health insurers and provider groups to develop, preconditions such as selective
contracting and option for patient to change provider should be in place.
Keywords: Managed competition, Disease management programmes, Price, Netherlands, Health insuranceBackground
Managed competition in health care has been intro-
duced in several countries [1,2]. Within managed com-
petition health insurers and health care providers are
supposed to compete on price and quality of health care
within certain rules established by the government to
guarantee public objectives. According to neoclassical
economics, an increase in competition among providers
and health insurers is associated with a decrease in price
when selective contracting is an option for health in-
surers. However, the neoclassical assumptions of perfect
information for all actors and certainty do not hold in
the health care market [3]. Physicians generally have
more information about diseases, diagnostic possibilities
and treatment effects than health insurers [4]. Uncer-
tainty exists about the timing of health care and the* Correspondence: c.vandijk@nivel.nl
1NIVEL, Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research, P.O. Box 1568,
3500, BN Utrecht, The Netherlands
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unless otherwise stated.effects of health care. Also, in neoclassical economics ef-
ficient allocation of health care is not necessarily socially
desirable, since particularly low income groups will then
be excluded from health care [5]. Solidarity and equity
are important values in most western countries with
public health insurance. These values are important in
policy decisions, which counteract the efficient alloca-
tion according to the neoclassical theory. For these rea-
sons, effects of managed competition on the price of
health care services may differ from the neoclassical re-
sponse to competition.
Literature on the effects of competition of both (orga-
nisations of) providers and health insurers on the price
of health care services show inconsistent results [6-12].
Suggested explanations for a lack or opposite effects of
competition on prices are the violation of requirements
for perfect competition, the relative shortages of health
care providers, the lack of eagerness of those insured to
switch providers, and the high marketing and advertisingl Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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policy makers little assistance in developing health pol-
icy. More insight into effects of competition on the price
of health care services is crucial for evaluating and devel-
oping health policy. The introduction of more managed
competition in the Dutch health care system provides op-
portunities to study effects of competition on the prices of
services.
In January 2006, the Dutch government introduced
The Health Insurance Act based on the principles of
managed competition [13]. The new health insurance
system gives insurers flexibility to design their products
to better appeal to patients and the ability to selectively
contract with health care providers as this is thought to
improve the efficiency of the health care system [14]. In
the new health insurance system, health insurers are
obliged to accept all applicants for the same premium,
and compete for those insured. The insured can exert
pressure on the insurers through their ability to switch
health insurance providers [15]. Qualitative information
on performance of both insurers and providers and ac-
tual different options for the insured are important pre-
requisites for those insured to make informed choices
and exert pressure. Freely negotiable tariffs have been in-
troduced gradually to control for possible undesirable ef-
fects, such as price rises or increases in provided services.
This gradual introduction is directed by the government.
A good example of this gradual introduction is hospital
care; the freely negotiable part of costs of hospitals rose
from 10% in 2006 to 20% in 2008, 31% in 2009 and to 70%
in 2012. Also, part of the tariffs of services of general
practitioners (GPs), physiotherapists, primary care psy-
chologists and dentists (from 2012 to 2013) are freely
negotiable. Reported effects of managed competition
are not always positive. Tariffs for hospital care in the
freely negotiable part decreased from 2009 to 2010 by
three percent, however this decrease was accompanied
with a ten percent increase in volume of services [16].
Experiments with free tariffs for dental care resulted in
an increase in tariffs, finally resulting in the prelimin-
ary abolishment of the experiment [17,18].
In this article, we investigate the association between
competition of both providers and health insurers, and
the price of disease management programmes (DMPs)
for type II diabetes mellitus. In the Netherlands, DMPs
can nationwide be financed by disease oriented funding
since 2010 (in Dutch: ‘integrale bekostiging’ – experimental
since 2007), also called bundled payments. Within disease
oriented funding, care is provided according to the national
multidisciplinary evidence-based health care standard
agreed between health care providers and patient organisa-
tions. Care has to be organised by a group of health care
providers (who form a legal entity – hereafter called care
groups) who negotiate a lumpsum remuneration perpatient with insurers. Care groups are the contracting
organisation and not necessarily the health care pro-
viders who deliver care. General practitioners (GPs)
play a central role in care groups [19-21]. Care groups
can either deliver (part of ) the care themselves or sub-
contract with other health care providers (e.g. dieti-
cians, medical specialists). In the Netherlands, every
discipline of health care providers in curative health
care has their own payment system. However, disease
oriented funding is a payment system of curative
health care across different disciplines. Without a con-
tract for DMPs between care groups and insurers, care
is financed per discipline.
This study aims to determine the association between
competition among care groups and health insurers, and
the price of DMPs, by conducting a cross-sectional study of
76 DMP contractual agreements for type II diabetes melli-
tus. We expected the price of DMPs for diabetes mellitus
patients to be lower with increased competition between
care groups and health insurers, with the lowest price in re-
gions with both markets regarded as competitive.
Methods
Study design
This was a cross-sectional, observational study analysing
the association between competition among care groups
and health insurers, and the price of DMPs for type II
diabetes mellitus in the Netherlands. Data were used
from 76 contractual agreementsa for the Dutch type II
diabetes mellitus DMP for 2008 (N = 8), 2009 (N = 33)
and 2010 (N = 35). Some contracts with care groups are
signed for more than one year with 2008 or 2009 as the
most recent contract available. One hundred nine care
groups operate in the Netherlands, making this a sample
of 70% of all possible contractual agreements [22]. Com-
petition between care groups and health insurers was
assessed at the level of municipal health services regions
(GGD-regions). GGD regions were selected as these regions
are expected to provide a regional overview of competition
among care groups, as well as, the ability to calculate the in-
surer concentration in these regions. There are 31 GGD re-
gions in the Netherlands, these regions are defined by postal
codes, with on average 530,000 inhabitants (min: 164,000;
max: 1,000,000). According to national data protection
guidelines ethical approval by an ethics committee is
unnecessary.
Data collection
Information on the price of DMPs was requested from
health insurers. The care purchasing department of eight
insurance companies were approached by telephone with
the request to provide contract data for this study. A docu-
ment containing the aim and methods of the study was
e-mailed to insurers who requested additional information.
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One insurer sent all their contracts via e-mail; the con-
tracts of the other insurer were viewed at the insurance
company. Although, only two out of eight insurers partici-
pated, we were able to include contracts of seven health in-
surers. In the Netherlands, the tendency of health care
providers was to negotiate with the health insurer with the
highest market share and to propose this contract to the
other health insurers in the region. In the time period
2008–2010, a lot of health insurers agreed upon the pro-
posed contract of another health insurer without additional
precondition or changes in tariffs. So, the two health in-
surers participating in our study agreed with contracts and
prices of DMPs made by other health insurers. For this rea-
son, contracts of other health insurers were included also.
The two insurers supplied data of 76 contracts from seven
insurers.
Data regarding the characteristics of the 109 Dutch
care groups in 2010 was obtained from previous studies
[22]. The care group data contains among others the care
groups’ city of residence and the number of GPs per care
group (available for 63 groups). 2009 data regarding the
patient insurer in the GGD regions (to estimate insurer
market concentration) was obtained from the NIVEL
‘Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel’ (N = 994) [23].
The Dutch ‘General Practitioner Registration’ (in Dutch:
huisartsenregistratie) was used to gather the number of
GPs per GGD region in 2009 [24].
Measures
Dependent variable
The dependent variable in the analyses was the price per
diabetes patient in Euros for a DMP as formulated in
the contractual agreements between health insurers and
care groups. The price of DMP was normally distributed
(Skewness-Kurtosis test p = 0.5471).
Independent variable
Three variables were used to quantify the market struc-
ture within the GGD regions: insurance market concen-
tration, the number of care groups, and the care group
market share.
1) Insurer market concentration was measured with the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and based on data
from the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel. The
index consists of the sum of the squared insurer
market shares for all insurers in the GGD regions
and ranges from 0 to 10,000. A higher Herfindahl
signifies a less competitive market. Insurance holdings’
daughter companies were recoded into the title of the
negotiating insurer. The HHI was calculated for 30 of
31 Dutch GGD regions. For one GGD-region the
HHI-index could not be calculated, as no consumerpanel data were available for this region. These cases
were excluded.
2) The number of care groups in a GGD region was
based on data of Dutch care groups.
3) The care group market share of GPs was calculated
by dividing the number of GPs per care group by
the total number of GPs in the GGD region in
which the care group is active, and ranges from 0–1.
No HHI was calculated since no information was
available about the number of diabetes mellitus type
II patients per region and per care group.
Statistical analyses
To analyse the association between competition of care
groups and health insurers and the price of DMPs, linear
regression analyses were conducted. The dependent vari-
able in the analyses was the price of DMPs. The inde-
pendent variables were insurance market concentration,
the number of care groups and care group market share.
Univariate and multivariate linear regression analyses
were performed. In the multivariate linear regression
analyses all independent variables were forced in the
model, regardless of the significance level. Separate
multivariate linear regression analyses were performed
for both measures of care group competition. Analyses
were adjusted for the percentage of persons with a low
income (lowest 40% of the whole country) and the per-
centage of persons with a western and non-western na-
tionality in a GGD region. To test whether the specific
health insurer influenced the association between market
competition and prices, univariate linear regression ana-
lyses were also separately performed for insurers with
twelve or more contracts (four insurers). The effect of
health insurer could not be estimated with a multilevel/
mixed model, since the insurers were partly regionally
divided. All analyses were conducted using the statistical
software STATA (version 10.0). Significance level was set
at p < 0.05.
Results
The average price of a DMP was €353.4 with a standard
deviation of 50.0. The median insurer market concentra-
tion was 2717 (IQR: 2302–3219), an oligopsony (a market
with only a few large buyers, here health insurers). The
number of GPs in a care group varied widely, with a me-
dian of 50 (IQR: 25–107) GPs. Care groups had a median
market share of 16% (IQR: 8-39%) in their region.
Table 1 presents the univariate and multivariate linear
regression analyses of the association between competi-
tion of care groups and health insurers and the price of
DMPs. Only a higher number of care groups in a region
was associated with a lower price of DMPs in the univar-
iate regression analyses. In the multivariate linear regres-
sion analysis this association was also found. The effect
Table 1 Association between competition of care groups and health insurers, and price of DMPs based on linear
regression analyses#
Univariate linear regression Multivariate linear regression$
Effect (95% CI) Effect (95% CI) Effect (95% CI)§
Insurer market concentration (HHI) 0.004 (−0.008-0.017) 0.009 (−0.005-0.024) 0.009 (−0.005 – 0.024)
Number of care groups in region −4.78 (−8.41 - -1.15)* −4.68 (−8.36 - -1.00)*
Care group market share$ 0.49 (−0.16 – 1.15) 0.37 (−0.31 – 1.05)
#Analyses were adjusted for the percentage of persons with a low income (lowest 40% of the whole country) and the percentage of persons with a western and
non-western nationality in a GGD region; $based on 63 care groups since no data were available on the number of GPs for 13 care groups; §Total variance explained
(R2): 9% and 10%; *p < 0.05.
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of five care groups; min: 1, max: 13) is limited.
To explore the relationship between insurer market
concentration and care group market share, we divided
contractual agreements into four groups depending on
the concentration of insurer market and care group mar-
ket share (Table 2). The four groups were based on an
equal distribution and not with respect to content, since
otherwise the power in some groups would have been
too limited.
Table 3 shows the results of the linear regression ana-
lyses with as reference group contractual agreements in
a region with both a concentrated insurer and care
group market. No significant difference in the price of
DMPs was found between the four competition groups.
Table 4 presents the univariate linear regression ana-
lyses of the association between competition of care
groups and health insurers and the price of DMPs per
health insurer (only for health insurers with twelve or
more contracts). These results substantially differ from
the results where all health insurers were included (see
last column in Table 4), indicating that the associa-
tions were largely influenced by health insurers. For all
health insurers together, the number of care groups in
region affected the price of DMPs negatively, whereas
opposite associations were found for three out of four
health insurers, although non-significant. It seems that
prices are set by health insurers instead of influenced
by market conditions. Analyses on the effect of health
insurers on the price of DMPs confirm this indication,
with a mean difference in price between health in-
surers of €58.Table 2 Distribution of contractual agreements on insurer ma
HHI insurer market >2
Care group market share >16% Both markets concentra
Care group market share ≤16% Insurer dominant marke
$Based on 63 care groups since no data was available on the number of GPs for 13
the care group market and the insurer market is less competitive; b‘Insurer dominan
but the care group market is more competitive; c‘Care group dominant market’ ref
care group market is less competitive; d‘Both market competitive’ refers to the s
more competitive.Discussion
This study examined the association between health in-
surer and care group market competition and the price
of DMPs. The insurer market concentration was not asso-
ciated with the price of DMPs, contrary to the expectation
based on neoclassical economics. Care group competition,
measured as the number of care groups in a GGD region,
was associated with a lower price: −€4.68 with an add-
itional care group in the region. As prices differed more
strongly between health insurers, the price of DMPs seems
to be more dependent on the particular health insurer
than on the market conditions.
Results of our study are not necessary applicable to
other countries, as they are highly dependent on the
health care system. Possible explanations for our find-
ings could be found in limited selective contracting of
health insurers, negotiations of care groups with the lar-
gest health insurer in the region, the lack of experience
with competition among care groups and health in-
surers, and the relative absence of options for patients to
change care group. Health insurers are allowed to select-
ively contract health care providers [25]. Despite this op-
portunity, health insurers did not selectively contract
health care providers until the autumn of 2010 [26]. So,
health insurers seem not to have used their important
instrument of selective contracting in the negotiation
process with care groups. This may explain the relatively
small association between care group competition and
the price of DMPs. Since 2010, increasingly health in-
surers have started selective contracting with health care
providers, which in the future may result in a greater as-
sociation between care group competition and the pricerket concentration and provider market share$
700 HHI insurer market ≤2700
teda (n = 18) Care group dominant marketc (n = 13)
tb (n = 18) Both markets competitived (n = 14)
care groups; a‘Both market concentrated’ refers to the situation where both
t market’ refers to the situation where the insurer market is less competitive,
ers to the situation where the insurer market is more competitive, but the
ituation where both the insurer market and the care group market are
Table 3 Association between the four competition groups




Both markets competitive (reference)
Care group dominant market −1.70 (−42.50 – 39.11)
Insurer dominant market −9.19 (−46.88 – 28.50)
Both markets concentrated 26.32 (−10.88 – 63.52)
#Analyses were adjusted for percentage of the persons with a low income
(lowest 40% of the whole country) and the percentage of persons with a
western and non-western nationality in a GGD region; $based on 63 care
groups since no data was available on the number of GPs for 13 care groups;
§Total variance explained (R2): 10%.
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high market share also hardly used their market power
to attain a higher price for their DMP. It could be that
health insurers offered a good price for the DMPs of
care groups and care groups did not feel the need to ne-
gotiate a higher price. In addition, a recent Dutch report
showed that health insurers work with calculation
models to make financial agreements [27]. Not in all cal-
culation models did care include of all involved health
care providers, such as dieticians. This may explain the
large difference in the price of DMPs between health
insurers.
Care groups often negotiate with the insurer with the
highest number of insured in their region. In this way,
benefits from negotiations from one health insurer are
transferred to other health insurers, which may not give
health insurers incentives to negotiate lower prices in a
region in which they have more market power, unless
substantial gains could be obtained. Increasingly, health
insurers start rejecting contractual agreements for DMPs
from other health insurers [28]. This might result in
more variation in prices between regions with different
levels of care group and insurer market competition.
However, it might not be realistic to expect extremely
different contracts for one care group, since the number
of care groups in a region is still limited and so is the
room to selectively contract DMPs for health insurers.
Both care groups and health insurers may have lacked
experience in the negotiation process of DMPs andTable 4 Association between competition of care groups and





Effect (95% CI) Effect (95% CI)
Insurer market concentration (HHI) −0.005 (−0.033-0.024) −0.001 (−0.012-0.
Number of care groups in region 5.66 (−17.29-28.62) 2.04 (−1.81 – 5.90
Care group market share 0.15 (−2.49 – 2.80) 0.12 (−0.29-0.53)
*p < 0.05.therefore prices may differ greatly between health in-
surers and less so with market competition. Disease ori-
ented funding was experimentally introduced in 2007
and nationwide in 2010. The organisation and manage-
ment of care groups is still in its infancy. Care groups
rarely select health care providers based on their per-
formance and poor performing providers are rarely ex-
cluded from care groups [29]. Including poor performers
may result in reduced process and patient outcomes and
may impede a good negotiation position for care groups.
Previous research showed that effects of provider com-
petition need time to develop [6-8]. Effects of care group
and health insurer competition may impact more on the
price of DMPs in a couple of years and prices may con-
verge between health insurers.
An important aspect in health care systems with man-
aged competition is patient choice. Those insured should
be able to make informed choices in selecting their
health insurance policy and health care providers. Cur-
rently, patients do not always know whether they take
part in a DMP and options to change a care group are
often restricted since the number of care groups in a re-
gion is often limited [29,30]. Therefore, patients can
hardly exert pressure on insurers by switching health in-
surance provider. This may result in less eagerness by
insurers to selectively contract or to put pressure on
care groups. In addition, selective contracting of care
groups may force patients to change GPs, since GPs cur-
rently form the basis of care groups. Patients may be
more loyal to their GP than insurer, and therefore in-
surers could lose patients when selective contracting,
making them less eager to selectively contract.
Limitations of this study
This study has some drawbacks. First, contracts may have
differed with respect to included health care services. Al-
though care is provided according to the national multi-
disciplinary evidence-based health care standard, some
care groups and health insurers could have agreed upon
additional services. Unfortunately, we did not have full in-
formation on the exact content of the contracts, which
could have influenced effects in both directions. Second,
this study does not take regional differences in diabetes se-






Effect (95% CI) Effect (95% CI) Effect (95% CI)
009) −0.002 (−0.015-0.010) −0.003 (−0.013-0.007) 0.004 (−0.008-0.017)
) 2.45 (−0.73-5.63) −0.51 (−2.30-1.28) −4.78 (−8.41 - - 1.15)*
0.23 (−0.34-0.79) 0.18 (−0.46-0.82) 0.49 (−0.16 – 1.15)
van Dijk et al. BMC Health Services Research 2014, 14:510 Page 6 of 7
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/510For instance, a region with a high proportion of diabetes
patients on insulin treatment is expected to result in a
higher contract price than a region with a low proportion
of these patients. This could have influenced our results in
both directions. Last, the working area of a care group has
been grouped into GGD regions, based on the statutory
place of registration. This way of grouping does not take
into account the exact field of activity of the care groups.
Competition arises when a patient has the possibility to
change health care provider within an acceptable distance,
which might be a smaller distance than within the GGD
regions. Our approach results in a regional competitive
level which does not have to correspond with the level of
competition between care groups in reality. Previous stud-
ies show that the definition of markets can influence ef-
fects in both directions [31].
Conclusions
The present study showed few economic benefits of care
group and health insurer competition on the price of
DMPs. Health insurer competition was not associated
with price of DMP and care group competition was as-
sociated with a limited lower price of DMPs. The price
of DMPs seems to be more dependent on the particular
health insurer than on the market conditions.
Endnote
aThe most recent available contract was selected per
care group.
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